SYNTHETIC DIVINE COMMAND THEORY

 

SYNTHETIC DIVINE COMMAND THEORY

Bruno dos Santos Queiroz (Sunkey)

Visiting Student at the Uehiro Oxford Institute.

PhD Philosophy Student at the Federal University of Uberlândia (Brazil)

bruno.queiroz@ufu.br

 

Abstract

This work develops a Synthetic Divine Command Theory (SDCT), an integrated metaethical framework designed to reconcile the foundational insights of Divine Command Theory with contemporary advances in semantic, ontological, axiological, and natural law approaches. The theory emerges in response to longstanding challenges within classical DCT, including arbitrariness, the Euthyphro dilemma, semantic reductionism, and epistemic inaccessibility. SDCT incorporates seven major components (cognitivist expressivism, non-naturalist non-realism, theistic projectivism, moderate theological voluntarism, Aristotelian perfectionist axiology, natural law promulgation, and a comprehensive taxonomy of metaethical positions) into a unified account of moral meaning, normativity, and obligation. Moral judgments are construed as expressing both truth-apt cognitive commitments and action-guiding normative attitudes; moral ontology is explained without appeal to ontologically heavy moral properties; divine commands are grounded in God’s essential goodness rather than arbitrary will; and the epistemic accessibility of moral truths is secured through natural law structures embedded in human rationality. The resulting synthetic theory preserves the voluntarist claim that moral obligation is constituted by divine commands while avoiding the classical objections raised against traditional formulations of DCT. SDCT demonstrates that divine authority, rational normativity, and human flourishing can be coherently integrated within a single metaethical framework.

Keywords: Synthetic Divine Command Theory; Metaethics; Moderate Theological Voluntarism; Aristotelian Perfectionism; Natural Law. 

INTRODUCTION

 

The purpose of this text is to present my doctoral research, which aims to develop a Synthetic Divine Command Theory grounded in the relationship between Divine Command Theory and metaethical positions. To achieve this, I will first present taxonomies of metaethical positions and, finally, introduce my integrated theoretical proposal. 

The text begins by outlining a comprehensive taxonomy of metaethical positions, distinguishing cognitivism, non-cognitivism, expressivist cognitivism, and quietism, and situating Divine Command Theory within this broader landscape. It then examines theories of practical reason and motivation, contrasting internalist and externalist accounts and clarifying how SDCT adopts externalism while separating justification from psychological motivation. Next, it surveys theories of moral justification, showing how SDCT integrates divine command with the dictate of reason and natural law, allowing both theists and atheists to possess moral reasons.

The work then analyzes axiological theories and grounds SDCT’s value theory in Aristotelian perfectionism and human flourishing. After presenting a taxonomy of Divine Command Theories, the text offers an overall view of SDCT as a response to classical objections through a synthesis of rational, semantic, and theological insights. The next sections develop each component of this synthesis: cognitivist expressivism to explain moral meaning, non-naturalist non-realism to avoid heavy metaphysics, theistic projectivism to explain moral phenomenology, moderate theological voluntarism to ground obligation in God’s nature-guided commands, Aristotelian axiology to explain the good, and natural-law promulgation to explain how divine commands become epistemically accessible and action-guiding.

 

I. TAXONOMY OF POSITIONS IN METAETHICS 

 

I will propose here a taxonomy of metaethical positions regarding the meaning of moral assertions. Similar to Miller’s proposal (2003), this classification starts from the distinction between cognitivism and non-cognitivism but makes it more complex in order to be more exhaustive and to reflect other subdivision proposals. I preferred to adopt this classification dividing positions into cognitivism and non-cognitivism instead of descriptivism and non-descriptivism as proposed by Richard Hare (1997) because, as will be considered, there are forms of cognitivism that are not descriptivist, such as the non-descriptivist cognitivism adopted by Derek Parfit (2011), also called non-realist cognitivism. 

The first major division is between (1) Cognitivism and (2) Non-cognitivism. Cognitivism holds that moral judgments express beliefs that can be true or false, whereas Non-cognitivism affirms that moral judgments do not express beliefs but attitudes, feelings, or commands, and therefore do not have truth value. Furthermore, there are mixed theories, such as (3) Expressivist Cognitivism, which seeks to combine elements of both cognitivism and non-cognitivism, and an additional strand, which is the rejection of fitting into any previous classification, which is (4) Quietism, suspending the ontological and semantic debate. Thus, we have the following taxonomy: 

 

(1) Cognitivism: 

Holds that moral judgments express beliefs that can be true or false. Within cognitivism, there are several currents: 

·                    (1.1) Error Theory: Holds that all moral judgments are false (because they presuppose the existence of objective moral properties, which do not exist), butare still practically useful.

·                    (1.2) Subjectivism: Maintains that the truth value of moral judgments depends on the attitudes,feelings, or beliefs of subjects. Within subjectivism, we can distinguish different strands: 

o       (1.2.1) Relativist Subjectivism: Argues that moral truth is relative to the opinions or feelings of individuals or cultures. This type of subjectivism can be further subdivided into: 

§    (1.2.1.1) Individual Subjectivism: Moral sentences are true by virtue of the opinions or feelings of the individual. 

§    (1.2.1.2) Cultural Subjectivism: Moral sentences are true according to the norms of a culture. 

o       (1.2.2) Non-relativist Subjectivism: This strand admits that the feelings or opinions of the subject determine moral truth butproposes that there is a universal or ideal standard to be followed. Some theories within this line include: 

§    (1.2.2.1) Divine Command Theory: Moral truth depends on God’s commandments. 

·                    (1.2.2.1.1) Voluntarist Divine Command Theory: Moral truth depends on God’s free will. 

·                    (1.2.2.1.2) Modified Divine Command Theory: Moral truth depends on commandments given by a loving God.

·                    (1.2.2.1.3) Rational Divine Preferences Theory: Moral truth depends on commandments given by God in accordance with His rational interests. 

§    (1.2.2.2) Ideal Observer Theory: The truth of a moral judgment depends on the approval of one or more ideal observers, who can be: 

·                    (1.2.2.2.1) Theomorphic Ideal Observer Theory: The ideal observer is identified with God. 

·                    (1.2.2.2.2) Anthropomorphic Ideal Observer Theory: The ideal observer(s) are conceived as a hypothetical human or humans endowed with rationality, full information, and emotional balance. 

§    (1.2.2.3) Constructivism: Moral truths are constructed from rational or intersubjective procedures.

·                    (1.3) Objectivism: Affirms that there are objective moral truths independent of individuals’ beliefs or attitudes. Within Objectivism, there are two main strands: 

o       (1.3.1) Moral Naturalism: Holds that moral properties are natural and accessible by empirical methods. Within this strand, we find: 

§    (1.3.1.1) Reductionist Naturalism: This approach identifies moral properties with specific natural properties, such as pleasure or well-being. 

·                    (1.3.1.1.1) Analytical Reductionism: Claims that moral language can be reduced to natural or scientific language. 

·                    (1.3.1.1.2) Synthetic Reductionism: Although there is an identity between moral and natural properties, it is not a linguistic reduction.

§    (1.3.1.2) Non-reductionist Naturalism: Holds that moral properties are irreducible, though still natural, asthey supervene on or depend on natural facts.

o       (1.3.2) Moral Non-naturalism: Holds that moral properties are non-natural, accessible by intuition orpractical reason. The main approaches include: 

§    (1.3.2.1) Moral Platonism: Affirms that objective moral facts are abstract entities.

§    (1.3.2.2) Intuitionism: Moral truths are directly accessed by moral intuitions without recourse to natural properties— can be combined with moral Platonism. 

§    (1.3.2.3) Non-realist Rationalism: Accepts the idea of moral truth accessed through reason as meaningful but without strong ontological commitment to moral entities.

 

 

(2) Non-cognitivism: 

Rejects the idea that moral judgments have truth value in a strong sense. According to this perspective, moral sentences express attitudes or prescriptions, not beliefs. Although these often appear or are adopted in mixed ways, the main theories within Non-cognitivism are: 

·                    (2.1) Emotivism: Maintains that moral judgments express emotions.

(2.2) Prescriptivism: Affirms that moral sentences are universal orders or prescriptions, e.g., “do not steal” = “no one ought to steal” .

·                    (2.3) Quasi-realism: Attempts to explain the use of moral language realistically through the idea of projectivism (feelings and other reactions triggered by natural features of things), without committing to a substantial moral ontology or strong truth sense.

·                    (2.4) Normative Expressivism: This theory holds that moral judgments express commitments to normative standards or norms and is a development of prescriptivism.

 

(3) Expressivist Cognitivism: 

A mixed theory combining elements of cognitivism and non-cognitivism.

According to this approach, a moral judgment expresses both a belief, which can be true or false, and an attitude or normative commitment. The theory seeks to integratethe explanatory advantages of both approaches, offering a more complete view of moral judgments.

 

(4) Quietism: 

Argues that moral language is functional and intelligible but without substantial metaphysical commitments. The theory recognizes that metanormative disputes are possible but cannot be conclusively resolved. The main challenge here is to maintain a weak normative realism without a clear ontological basis. 

            A fruitful convergence seems possible between three contemporary approaches to normativity: Gibbard and Blackburn’s quasi-realist expressivism; Thomas Nagel and Derek Parfit’s non-naturalist and non-realist cognitivism; and Peter Railton’s weak normative naturalism.

In my thesis, I propose that the best formulations of Divine Command Theory (DCT) can converge with this triple theory. This convergence presupposes a refined reinterpretation of DCT, capable of incorporating expressivist and cognitivist elements without relinquishing its theological foundation. Such a reinterpretation would involve, first, a theistic projectivism according to which moral judgments express emotional responses appropriate to God’s authority and command, without being merely subjective or arbitrary. Second, it would include a theory of rational divine preferences, according to which God’s commands express His perfect and morally justified reasons, which is why these commands can serve as a criterion of correctness for the expressivist component of moral judgments.

 

 

II. THEORIES OF REASON AND MOTIVATION

 

Another classification of positions in metaethics divides approaches between internalism and externalism, reflecting a distinction concerning the nature of practical reasons. Practical reasons are what count in favor of acting in a certain way. Practical reasons can be distinguished between internal reasons and external reasons. 

·                    (1) Internal reasons are those that are identical to or reducible to psychological states. 

·                    (2) External reasons, in turn, are normatively irreducible reasons—that is, reasons that cannot be reduced to psychological states. 

Thus, we have the following views: 

1.                 Internalism: The position according to which normative reasons are identical or reducible to internal reasons that a subject currently has or would have in ideal situations. 

2.                 Externalism: The position according to which, in addition to internal reasons, we have irreducibly normative reasons. 

Internalism itself is divided into: 

·                    (1.1) Analytic Internalism: Asserts that to say someone has a normative reason means to say that this person possesses or would possess certain internal reasons. 

·                    (1.2) Non-analytic Internalism: Claims that although normative reasons are in reality identical or reducible to internal reasons, normative moral concepts are not reducible, in the field of language, to internalist concepts. 

 

Another discussion concerns theories of motivation. We have the following positions regarding the nature of motivational states: 

1.                 Psychologism: The position according to which only mental states—beliefs and desires—can motivate action. 

2.                 Anti-psychologism: The thesis that non-psychological states, such as objective normative reasons, can also be sources of motivation. 

Within psychologism, important variants are distinguished: 

·                    1.1 Strict Humean Psychologism: Holds that only desires, and not beliefs, can motivate intentional actions, and that a belief that something is morally right cannot by itself generate a desire that motivates action. 

·                    1.2 Moderate Humean Psychologism: Admits that moral beliefs automatically generate desires, but it is the desires, not the beliefs, that properly motivate action. 

·                    1.3 Moderate Cognitivist Psychologism: Argues that both beliefs and desires, as mental states, can motivate action. 

·                    1.4 Pure Cognitivist Psychologism (or Pure Cognitivism): Maintains that only beliefs (particularly normative or rational beliefs) motivate actions, and desires play no causal role in motivation. 

 

A crucial distinction in my theory is, therefore, between normative justification and psychological motivation. The belief that an action is commanded by God can morally justify the action regardless of the agent’s psychological motivation. Even if the agent does not recognize or is not motivated by this command, the objective reason to act according to the divine command remains valid. Thus, the theory adopts an externalist perspective recognizing the irreducibility of moral normativity.

 

 

III. THEORIES OF JUSTIFICATION 

 

Another classification concerns theories of justification. Three main theories stand out in this debate: 

1.                 The Theory of the Dictate of Reason: Maintains that simply recognizing something as a duty required by reason is, by itself, sufficient to justify the correct action. 

2.                 The Theory of Internal Resonance: According to this theory, an adequate answer to the question "Why should I do the right thing?" must be connected to the agent’s desires, either those the agent currently has or those they would have under ideal conditions of information and rationality. 

3.                 The Divine Command Theory of Moral Obligations: Affirms that the only fully sufficient answer to the question "Why should I do the right thing?" is: "Because that is what God requires of me." 

 

Tthe Synthetic Divine Command Theory reformulates the Divine Command Theory of Moral Obligations by suggesting that divine commands are sufficient but not necessary for moral obligation. While divine commands may provide valid reasons for moral action, moral normativity can also be grounded in reasons independent of divine command. Therefore, atheists have sufficient justification for moral life, but if God exists, divine command provides an additional complementary reason for moral normativity.

In this context, Synthetic DCT aligns with the Theory of the Dictate of Reason, which holds that practical reason suffices to ground moral normativity, and with the Theory of Promulgation via Natural Law, suggesting that divine commands can be known through proper use of reason in moral matters, regardless of explicit belief in God. Thus, Synthetic DCT maintains that morality does not depend on religion, upholding Ethics as a discipline of natural reason.

Finally, if God exists, He serves as an ideal to correct human preferences, with God’s rational desires functioning as the criterion for evaluating the good. However, even in God’s absence, human preferentialism can be applied: something is valuable (or has positive non-instrumental value) if and only if a rational, reflective, and sufficiently informed agent would prefer it to its absence, based on an empirically possible cognitive perspective, without better or equally good alternative perspectives leading to an opposite preference.

 

IV. THEORIES OF VALUE

 

Another fundamental area of metaethics is axiology, or the theory of value. A theory of value seeks to answer the question: what is valuable in a non-instrumental way — that is, what is desirable for its own sake, and not merely because it leads to something else? Theories of value can be classified according to the following taxonomy: 

 

(1) Monist Theories: 

Affirm that there is only one kind of thing that possesses non-instrumental value (i.e., is good in itself). 

·                    (1.1) Hedonism: States that only pleasure (and/or the absence of pain) has non-instrumental value. It is subdivided into: 

o       (1.1.1) Sensational Hedonism: Defines pleasure as a specific sensation, with its own phenomenological properties. 

o       (1.1.2) Motivational Hedonism: Defines pleasure as the attitude of wanting something to continue, i.e., something preferred to having it not. 

o       (1.1.3) Adverbial Hedonism: Understands pleasure as the pleasurable manner of engaging in an activity, regardless of what the activity is. ·                    

Transversally, hedonism can also be classified into: 

o       (1.1.a) Quantitative Hedonism: Pleasures differ only in quantity, not in quality. 

o       (1.1.b) Qualitative Hedonism: Pleasures differ in quality and dignity, in addition to quantity. 

·                    (1.2) Preferential Theory: States that only the satisfaction of desires or preferences has non-instrumental value. It is divided into: 

o       (1.2.1) Actual Preferences Theory: Considers the satisfaction of preferences as they actually are to be valuable. 

o       (1.2.2) Ideal Preferences Theory: Considers the satisfaction of preferences an agent would have under ideal deliberative conditions to be valuable. 

o       (1.2.3) Divine Preferences Theory: States that non-instrumental value consists in the satisfaction of divine will. 

 

(2) Pluralist Theories: 

Affirm that more than one kind of thing can have non-instrumental value in itself. 

·                    (2.1) Value as Intrinsic Quality Theory: States that certain states of affairs possess intrinsic value due to their own quality, independently of their effects or the presence of desires (e.g., beauty, harmony, knowledge through contemplation, etc.). 

·                    (2.2) Perfectionism: Holds that non-instrumental value resides in the realization of human excellences (virtues, capacities). It is subdivided into: 

o       (2.2.1) Aristotelian Perfectionism: Maintains that the ultimate good consists in the realization of a set of human virtues of intrinsic value. 

o       (2.2.2) Nietzschean Perfectionism: Holds that the ultimate good resides in the affirmation of life, creativity, psychic health, and vital force. 

o       (2.2.3) Theories of Autonomy and Authenticity: Maintain that values such as autonomy, authenticity, self-knowledge, self-realization, reflective freedom, meaningful engagement, and personal integrity are distinct intrinsic goods. 

·                    (2.3) Relational Value Theories: Assert that certain types of human relationships possess non-instrumental value, such as friendship, love, trust, or life in community. 

·                    (2.4) Objective List Theories: Assert that there is a plural and objective list of intrinsically valuable goods, such as knowledge, pleasure, friendship, virtue, contemplation, personal achievement, among others. 

 

The Synthetic Divine Command Theory (SDCT) grounds its axiology in an Aristotelian form of perfectionism, integrating insights from Eudaimonist Perfectionism to articulate a value theory in which the ultimate good is identified with human flourishing (eudaimonia). Drawing on the Aristotelian idea that the good for any being lies in the excellent fulfillment of its characteristic function, and that rational activity is the defining function of human nature, the SDCT holds that eudaimonia consists in the excellent exercise of rationality.

This perfectionist conception of the good is then connected to the divine will: if an omniscient and benevolent God exists, He would rationally desire the due good of His creatures, namely their full realization or flourishing. Accordingly, divine commands are understood as teleologically ordered to guiding human beings toward this flourishing, not as arbitrary decrees but as expressions of God’s preference for what completes our nature.

 Supported by the Theology of the Perfect Being, which affirms the convertibility of being and goodness, the SDCT maintains that created natures are finite imitations of divine perfection and thus possess intrinsic goods grounded in their essences. In this way, the SDCT adopts Aristotelian perfectionism as its axiological base, treating the good as conceptually prior to divine commands while regarding those commands as the authoritative means by which God communicates and enacts that antecedent good.

 

V. DIVINE COMMAND THEORIES 

 

From the previous considerations, it is possible to distinguish different forms of Divine Command Theories depending on the domain considered. Thus, we have the following taxonomy of Divine Command Theories: 

 

(1) Semantic Divine Command Theories: 

Hold that saying something is morally right means saying, or is coextensive with saying, that it is commanded by God. 

·                    (1.1) Voluntarist Semantic Divine Command Theory: Maintains that moral correctness consists in being commanded by God based on His sovereign and free will. 

·                    (1.2) Modified Semantic Divine Command Theory: Maintains that the morally right is what is commanded by a loving God. 

·                    (1.3) Kripkean Semantic Divine Command Theory: Maintains that the concepts “what a loving God commands” and “what is morally right” are distinct in intension (meaning) but coextensive in all possible worlds, a necessary identity known a posteriori. 

 

(2) Divine Command Theory of Normative Reasons: 

Holds that moral normative reasons are identical to, reducible to, or provided by God’s commands. 

·                    (2.1) Internalist Divine Command Theory: Maintains that normative reasons are identical or reducible to God’s internal reasons. 

·                    (2.2) Externalist Divine Command Theory: Maintains that divine commands provide irreducibly normative reasons. 

 

(3) Divine Command Theory of Moral Obligations: 

Maintains that the ultimate moral motivation to act rightly derives from divine authority. 

 

(4) Axiological Divine Command Theory: 

Maintains that the ultimate good is determined by God’s will. 

·                    (4.1) Realist Divine Preferences Theory: Maintains that if a loving and omniscient God created the universe with specific purposes, then His preferences constitute the objective standard for the correctness or rationality of human preferences. 

·                    (4.2) Counterfactual Divine Preferences Theory (Theomorphic Ideal Observer Theory): Maintains that the correctness of human preferences should be evaluated based on the preferences a perfect God would have, if such a God existed. 

 

My thesis consists, therefore, in constructing a Synthetic Divine Command Theory (SDCT), an integrated metaethical framework combining elements of Divine Command Theory, ethical rationalism, and Natural Law Theory. Its goal is to create a more philosophically resilient model of moral normativity, one capable of addressing traditional objections to Divine Command Theory and explaining both the meaning and ground of moral judgments.

SDCT  integrates contributions from cognitivist expressivism, non-naturalist non-realism, theistic projectivism, moderate theological voluntarism, Aristotelian perfectionist axiology, and promulgation-based natural law theory. The Synthetic Divine Command Theory (SDCT) is not merely a modified version of standard Divine Command Theory but a synthetic framework that integrates insights from multiple areas of moral philosophy and axiology.

 

VI. OVERALL VIEW OF SDCT

 

The Synthetic Divine Command Theory (SDCT) is conceived as a proposal for an integrated metaethical theory, whose aim is to reconcile the central concepts of the Divine Command Theory (DCT) with sophisticated perspectives from contemporary metaethics, semantics, axiology, and epistemology. In doing so, the SDCT seeks to preserve the authority of God in morality while responding to classical criticisms directed at DCT, such as arbitrariness and moral subjectivism.

The SDCT’s framework is grounded in several fundamental assumptions that guide its theoretical structure. First, the Divine Preference as Criterion establishes that, if God exists as an omniscient being, the creator of the universe with purposes and reasons, and cares about the well-being of creatures, then His preferences constitute the ultimate standard for evaluating the correctness or rationality of human preferences, as well as for determining the value of actions and objects.

According to the Theory of Divine Preferences as a Criterion of Rational Correction, divine preferences are considered rational in a procedural sense because God is a fully informed being whose cognitive faculties function properly. This should be understood metaphorically, however, since God is a being of pure intellect who apprehends all truths simultaneously, rather than a rational agent in the ordinary sense. Divine preferences derive from a perfect and fully informed consciousness of the objective goods of the world, which, in turn, are understood as finite expressions of God’s infinite perfections. In this way, God functions as a regulative ideal for the correction of human preferences. This approach does not focus on what constitutes the ultimate good, but rather on how we can discern what is good.

Second, the SDCT defends Sufficiency, rather than Necessity, for Moral Obligation. God’s commandments are understood as sufficient conditions for moral obligation, but not as exclusive prerequisites. This position allows moral duties to be recognized and justified even in the absence of belief in God, providing an elegant solution to the so-called “atheist virtuoso problem.” Accordingly, the theory ensures that morality retains consistency and rationality independently of explicit religious adherence, while preserving divine authority as a normative reference.

Finally, the SDCT emphasizes the Nature of Divine Commands, maintaining that they are grounded in the recognition of the inherent good of creation, rather than in arbitrary or capricious decisions. God’s commands are conceived as instruments for guiding human beings toward the fulfillment of their own nature and the realization of the good due to them. In this way, the SDCT combines the normative dimension of divine authority with a rational and teleological understanding of morality, offering an approach that is simultaneously theological, ethical, and epistemically grounded.

 

VII. THEORIES OF VALUE

 

The first component of the SDCT is Cognitivist Expressivism, a hybrid metaethical approach that seeks to reconcile elements of cognitivism and non- cognitivism. This perspective holds that moral judgments have a dual aspect: they simultaneously express a belief that can be true or false (the cognitivist aspect) and an attitude or normative commitment that can be evaluated as correct or incorrect (the expressivist aspect), with both aspects being assessable according to objective standards.

In the cognitivist component, moral judgments are understood as propositions that can be true or false and that express irreducible normative reasons. These truths cannot be fully reduced to natural facts but can be evaluated through the proper use of reason, employing methods such as reflective equilibrium or critical thinking. By incorporating this aspect, the SDCT ensures that moral judgments are not mere appearances or arbitrary expressions but rationally justifiable normative beliefs, aligned with the objective structure of morality. The truth of the cognitive element is related to non-naturalist, non- realist moral properties.

The expressivist aspect, in turn, recognizes that moral judgments involve emotional responses and normative attitudes in addition to cognitive elements. When declaring an action to be right or wrong, the agent not only believes a moral proposition but also manifests an appropriate emotional response, such as obedience, disapproval, or approval. This dimension of moral judgment is crucial for understanding how moral values and norms are integrated into practical life, guiding both feelings and behavior. It also relates to the fact that we project our attitudes both onto the natural world and (for theists) onto God’s commands.

VIII. NON-NATURALIST NON-REALISM

 

The second component of the SDCT is Non-Naturalist Non-Realism, also known as Non-Descriptivist Cognitivism, which adopts a perspective holding that moral judgments express beliefs that can be true or false, but whose truth does not depend on the existence of properties or facts in a strong ontological sense. These truths are considered irreducible, objective, and non-natural, analogous to logical and mathematical truths. This approach provides the SDCT with an objective and non-arbitrary foundation for divine morality, allowing moral judgments to be genuinely true without appealing to strange metaphysical entities, thereby limiting what God can command in a way that is coherent with moral rationality.

Within the framework of cognitivism, Non-Naturalist Non-Realism holds that moral judgments express beliefs with truth value, distinguishing it from non-cognitivist theories such as emotivism or classical prescriptivism, which view moral judgments merely as expressions of emotions or commands without propositional content.

Although moral judgments express true beliefs, non-realism maintains that their truth does not depend on concrete properties or facts in a strong ontological sense. While physical or psychological properties have concrete existence and causal efficacy, moral facts exist analogously to logical or mathematical facts, representing necessary and irreducible truths, yet without postulating substantial metaphysical entities. This perspective allows the SDCT to affirm the existence of objective moral truths without appealing to a robust ontology of strange moral entities in the world.

The moral truths recognized by the SDCT have three essential characteristics:

1.      Irreducibility: Normative properties cannot be reduced to natural or descriptive properties; even a complete factual description does not, by itself, determine what one ought to do.

2.      Objectivity: These truths are universal, existing independently of human attitudes, feelings, or conventions, and determining how things ought to be for moral action to be rationally possible.

3.      Non-Naturalness: Fundamental moral truths are necessary and non-natural, analogous to logical or mathematical truths. For example, the proposition that undeserved suffering is wrong holds true in all possible worlds.

 

The adoption of Non-Naturalist Non-Realism is crucial to resolving the problem of arbitrariness in Voluntarist Divine Command Theory. Because moral truths are logically necessary, not even God’s will can alter them. God, therefore, recognizes these moral truths, just as He recognizes necessary logical and mathematical truths, and does not create them arbitrarily. This implies that God cannot command morally wrong actions, ensuring that divine commands are perfect expressions of divine moral reason rather than products of caprice or arbitrariness.

IX. THEISTIC PROJECTIVISM

The third component of the SDCT is Theistic Projectivism. Projectivism, in the field of metaethics, is a thesis situated within the tradition of expressivism and anti- realism, holding that moral judgments do not describe objective ontological facts, such as moral properties, but rather express attitudes that result from projections onto non- moral or natural facts. According to this perspective, our moral responses arise as conative responses (that is, emotional or dispositional reactions) to natural facts. A notable form of this approach is quasi-realism, which explains how moral discourse, by expressing these projected attitudes, mimics the language of truth, granting moral judgments a quasi-objective character, even though they are derived from subjective projections.

I agree with quasi-realism in rejecting moral realism and viewing the notion of ontological moral properties in a strong sense as a concept arising from our projections of moral connotations onto the world. However, I diverge from classical quasi-realism in that I accept a strong sense of moral truth. Theistic Projectivism incorporates classical projectivism, extending it to include moral attitude projections beyond the natural world.

Thus, Theistic Projectivism constitutes an extension of the projectivist logic to a theistic worldview. It operates under the premise that the conative responses we project are not limited to natural properties but also extend to supernatural and divine properties. In this context, religious attitudes are not mere psychological constructions; rather, they constitute responses that can be appropriate or inappropriate to God’s commands. Emotions and dispositions such as worship, reverence, fear, love, or obedience are understood as projected responses to a divine entity, reflecting a direct interaction with the sacred.

The integration of Theistic Projectivism into the Synthetic Divine Command Theory (SDCT) allows for a coherent articulation of the relationship between God’s will and the moral response of the agent. The believer’s moral judgments express emotional responses appropriate to divine authority and commands, such that moral obedience and ethical action are not reduced to rational understanding alone but involve a profound emotional response, evoking internal dispositions such as reverent fear or unconditional love for God. In this way, the expressivist dimension of moral judgment is theologically grounded, linking the supernatural basis of morality to the agent’s emotional and motivational experience.

Theistic Projectivism seeks to explain the expressivist component by determining that the sentiment or attitude expressed by the agent must be the correct or appropriate emotional response to the divine command. The criterion for assessing this correctness is provided by the Theory of Rational Divine Preferences, which underpins the perfectionist axiology of the SDCT. Accordingly, the agent’s attitudes are considered appropriate when aligned with the perfect and morally justified reasons that ground God’s commands. This integration allows the SDCT to recognize the conative and motivational dimension of morality—the agent’s internal disposition to obey arises from a profound emotional response to divine authority—while simultaneously maintaining the objectivity and rationality of moral judgment, as the correctness of these attitudes is evaluated according to the rational preferences of a perfect God.

X. MODERATE THEOLOGICAL VOLUNTARISM

 

The fourth component of the SDCT is Moderate Theological Voluntarism (MTV). In its most basic formulation, theological voluntarism holds that God’s will determines the moral character of certain facts or actions. However, MTV distinguishes itself from Radical Theological Voluntarism, which asserts that all moral commands derive solely from God’s free and absolute will, rendering morality entirely contingent and potentially arbitrary. To address this issue, MTV introduces a crucial distinction between two types of divine commands: necessary moral commands and contingent commands.

(1)   Necessary moral commands are grounded in God’s essential goodness and nature, and are therefore independent of His free will. These commands are necessary and immutable, valid in all possible worlds, and directly express the divine nature, which is essentially good, just, and wise. The SDCT maintains that God issues these commands based on the recognition of the due good inherent in creation, not as the result of arbitrary determination. Consequently, He could not command morally abhorrent actions, such as the torture of innocents, as such acts would be incompatible with His essentially good nature. Examples of such commands include universal duties like loving God and speaking the truth, which flow naturally from God’s loving and truthful essence.

(2)   Contingent commands, by contrast, are those whose validity depends on a contingent order of things that God chooses to establish in the world. These commands are tied to specific institutions, norms, practices, or social organizations, such as private property or marriage, so that certain moral obligations derive from concrete structures created by God. Although contingent— and thus potentially different if the world’s order were otherwise — these commands are not arbitrary. Once a specific social or institutional structure is established, the duties that follow from it are rationally and coherently determined, ensuring that morality remains non-arbitrary. Furthermore, these commands can encompass both matters of universal morality and norms applicable to specific social or liturgical contexts.

 

MTV preserves moral objectivity by constraining divine will through God’s essentially good nature. In this way, God’s will is not sovereign to the point of violating His own essence, thereby avoiding arbitrariness. Moreover, the SDCT understands that divine commands are sufficient, but not necessary, for moral obligation: they provide normative authority, yet this authority is constrained by the necessary nature of the good. While morality depends on a subject — God — it remains universal, since God’s nature is immutable and necessary.

XI. ARISTOTELIAN PERFECTIONIST AXIOLOGY

 

The Aristotelian Perfectionist Axiology (or Eudaimonist Perfectionism) constitutes a central component of the Synthetic Divine Command Theory (SDCT), responsible for determining what constitutes the ultimate good or non-instrumental value (in a still pre-moral sense). This axiology complements the metaethical framework of the SDCT by providing the content of value over which divine commands operate, linking what is objectively good with the normative authority that renders it obligatory.

In general, Perfectionism maintains that non-instrumental value resides in the realization of human excellences, understood as virtues and capacities inherent to the human being. Within the context of the SDCT, the ultimate good for human beings is identified with a life of flourishing or full realization (eudaimonia), achieved through the excellent actualization of one’s own nature.

This perspective is grounded in Perfectionist Functionalism, which holds that the best state of any entity consists in the most complete and excellent development of its proper functions. For human beings, this optimal state is called the “due good”, corresponding to a life of flourishing. Aristotle argues that the distinctive function of human beings is rational activity; consequently, full realization consists in excellent rational activity, a life that best satisfies the rational preferences of the agent.

The connection between Perfectionist Axiology and the Divine Command Theory is established through the Theology of the Perfect Being, which provides an objective and non-arbitrary foundation for value. The theological tradition maintains that being and goodness are coextensive (ens et bonum convertuntur), so that everything that exists is a finite way of reflecting God’s infinite perfections. The nature of a thing is thus a good or a perfection insofar as it imitates divine attributes. God does not create essences arbitrarily; He knows all possible manifestations of His essence and determines that only certain possibilities come into existence. The SDCT holds that God recognizes, rather than invents, the due good that follows from the imitation of His perfections in creation, so that the due good of human nature—eudaimonia—derives from the manner in which this nature reflects the divine essence.

Adopting this axiology allows the SDCT to integrate objective value (what is good) with normative authority (what is obligatory). God, being essentially good, desires the due good of all His creatures, and divine commands are issued with the purpose of guiding human beings toward full realization (eudaimonia). This divine desire functions as a perfectly rational preference, serving as the ultimate criterion to evaluate the value of actions and the correctness of human preferences, according to the Theory of Divine Rational Preferences. At the same time, morality is seen as a necessary truth, to which not even divine will can oppose itself. Thus, God cannot command morally wrong actions, and His commands remain consistent with the due good that He recognizes.

In this way, God serves as the indirect foundation of morality. The primary foundation of morality is the good inherent in human nature; yet, because this nature reflects the nature of God, if He exists, God becomes the indirect foundation of moral obligation. Since God, through His rational preferences, desires the good of all His creatures, He desires human flourishing, and consequently, His commands are coherent with this good, which forms part of the rational and natural order of the world.

XII.       PROMULGATION-BASED NATURAL LAW THEORY

 

The Natural Law Theory based on Promulgation constitutes the sixth essential component of the Synthetic Divine Command Theory (SDCT), offering a solution to one of the greatest challenges faced by the Divine Command Theory (DCT): the problem of epistemic accessibility and the universality of moral commandments. The SDCT maintains that, although the authority for moral obligation derives from God, the content of this morality is accessible to human reason, allowing moral principles to be recognizable by all rational agents.

Traditionally, DCT and Natural Law Theory (NLT) have been regarded as opposing positions. While NLT holds that universal and immutable moral principles exist, knowable through reason and derived from human nature itself, SDCT proposes a reconciliation of these perspectives. God remains the ultimate authority of moral obligation, providing sufficient reasons for ethical action through His commands. At the same time, promulgation-based NLT asserts that these divine commandments can be rationally accessed, making them manifest and comprehensible to all rational agents.

In this way, Natural Law functions as a medium through which God’s commands—His preceptive will—become known and applicable. SDCT transforms what is good (the axiological content) into duty (the deontological content), ensuring that morality is both objective and rationally accessible.

The integration of promulgation guarantees that morality is accessible to all rational agents, regardless of explicit belief in God or special religious revelation. SDCT adopts the perspective of the Theory of the Dictates of Reason, considering that practical reason alone is sufficient to ground moral normativity. Divine commands provide an additional, sufficient reason to justify moral action, but not a necessary reason.

This distinction allows SDCT to address the classic objection of the “virtuous atheist”: an atheist can possess sufficient justification for moral living through natural reason alone. Divine command, accessed through Natural Law, merely complements this moral normativity for believers.

SDCT recognizes multiple mechanisms through which divine commands can be promulgated and made binding for rational agents. According to Richard Mouw (1990), these means include:

1.      Natural Law: basic moral principles inscribed in human constitution and knowable through reason;

2.      Moral Conscience: an internal faculty that aids in discerning right from wrong;

3.      Social Institutions: structures such as family, customs, and civil laws that convey moral norms;

4.      Special Revelation: sacred texts and religious traditions;

5.      Individual Revelations: personal experiences, such as dreams or spiritual convictions.

 

CONCLUSION

 

The Synthetic Divine Command Theory (SDCT) is an integrated metaethical approach that unifies what is morally good with what is obligatory, grounding ultimate value and moral obligation in Rational Divine Preferences. Within this framework, Cognitivist Expressivism explains that SDCT’s moral judgments combine true beliefs about moral facts with appropriate attitudes toward divine authority, while Non-Naturalist Non-Realism ensures that these judgments are objective and irreducible truths, analogous to logical laws, yet not derived from natural properties. Theistic Projectivism, in turn, links moral evaluation to responses projected in accordance with God’s rational preferences, thereby conferring normative authority on moral judgments. Together, these elements function within SDCT to connect the cognitive and expressive dimensions of moral judgment with the objective grounding and divine authority that render moral obligations binding

Moderate Theological Voluntarism maintains that divine commands are a sufficient but not necessary condition for moral obligation, distinguishing between necessary commands (derived from God’s essentially good nature) and contingent commands (dependent on institutions established by Him), thus preserving the non- arbitrary character of morality. Aristotelian Perfectionist Axiology defines the ultimate good (eudaimonia) as the full flourishing of human nature through rational excellence, linking moral value to the realization of human essence as a reflection of divine perfection. Promulgation-Based Natural Law Theory ensures that these divine commands are epistemically accessible to all rational agents, whether through reason, conscience, social institutions, or special revelation.

Metaphorically, SDCT can be seen as a GPS, where human flourishing represents the final destination, necessary truths function as the unchanging map, and divine commands provide the authority and obligation to follow the routes. It is also like an orchestra, in which the Theory of Rational Divine Preferences acts as the conductor, while Non-Naturalist Non-Realism constitutes the universal score of moral truths that must be followed.

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This text is only a provisional draft of my thesis, which is still under development. If you disagree, have comments, or suggestions about the theory I am developing, please send me an email at bruno.queiroz@ufu.br.

Also check this video: https://youtu.be/waHznn6ngaI?si=bnepbRX7xBxr09-N

 

Oxford, November 26^th 2025.